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CENTRALIZED BARGAINING STRUCTURES
AND REFERENDUM RIGHTS
Michael L. Brookshire

~n ai:alysi . of bargaining ~tructure primarily focuses upon two
n:aJor ~1m~ns10ns of a ~oll~ct1ve bargaining relationship. The first
?1men ion 1 the org~mzat1?n ~f the parti~s for collective bargain.
mg, and the second d1men 10n 1 the locat1on(s) of decision-making
power within the e organizations for bargaining.
Few tudent of indu trial relation would argue with the contention that the mo t significant trend in union bargaining structures
from the 1930's to the sixtie lay in the centralization of such structure . This centralization wa both vertical and horizontal. It was
vertical in the en e that decision-making power was transferred
upward from the local union level to the national union level. It was
al o horizontal becau e ind pendent unions, at local, intermediate,
and national levels joined together in various formal and informal
way to bargain with common employers. Employer centralization
for bargaining likewi e occurred: horizontal centralization was the
mo t vi ible and wa manife ted in the growth of multiemployer
bargaining tructures. 1
Practitioner of collective bargaining and academician have also
noted the reaction of many union member and local union leader
against the degr e of structural centralization which ha been
evolving on the union ide . The reaction probably began among the
craft workers of indu trial union in the mid -fiftie . The purpo eof
thi article i to evaluate centralized bargaining tructu re from the
vi wpoint of the bargaining partie and of society and to ugg~~t a
mean of pre erving the beneficial aspects of centralized bargamtng
while minimizing the impact of it chief drawback .

1

Evaluating Centralized Bargaining
J,

Two rea ons for union centralization have received the mot
treatment in the literature: the need to pr serve an? expa~d
leverage in bargaining as tructural change occurred i.n mdu .tnal
organization and the need to bargain succe fully over mcreas1.ngly
complex i ue . For example, as product market ~eca~e natwnal
in cope, bu ine firms began to produce for a nat10nw1de market
from plant t hat were often cattered across the country. If local
of the same, or of different, national union bargained for epar~te
labor contracts at each plan t location, the strike threat and b~rgar
ing clout of each local might be ineffective. The comp.an_Y migh~ c~
able to weather even a long strike at one plant by hiftmg pro u
tion to other plants . Therefore , V rtical centralization becare
necessary within unions, so t hat bargaining at the national level or
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all plants would make the trike threat effective. Horizontal centralizat ion among local and national unions wa al o directed at the
ame end.
Horizontal centralization in the last two decades ha largely been
a union re pon e to another significant change in indu trial organ •
ization , t he diver ification of bu ine s firm and the conglomerate
merger movement. A um that a bu iness firm produce fifty un related product line and bargain
parately with fifty different
union repre enting the production worker of each product line.
How can any of the union threaten the firm with eriou harm
from a t rike when th firm can continue normal production and
ale in it oth r 49 line ? In the e ca e • union realized the nece ity of pu hing for common xpiration date on their contract and
of coop rating clo ely in bargaining, o that the firm would fac
meaningful pr ure from a united front of it mployee ' organization .
Another ofien -m ntion d rea on for union c ntralization,
e pecially of the v rtical typ , i th chang d nature of bargaining
i u . ft r World Warll. a harp! incr a ing perc ntage of total
compen ation began to com to work r in the form of fring b nefit . Local union bargaining ov r fring found insurance, p n ion.
and other i ue in r a ingly ·omplicat d. Experti
in uch
matt r t nd d to r id at national union lev I·, and d i ionmaking power b gan Lo flow upward for Lhi rea ·on. Bargaining
over th
i u
al high r lev I al o b cam pr f rabl for
actuarial and admini tra iv purp e 2
Apart fro
w 11-publiciz d
or union centralization, other f
of entralization
ly of th horizontal
lra tive to labor
um , for exampl ,
typ , hav p
argain for work
ame firm or gov rn that veral
m nt agency at either the natio
al, or local I vel.
io will
m ber hip rela f'.erhap . a f w of t
t1_v to th other uni
nl
the
io
pr ent indiv_1dual with criti al
th
uni
ap
nificant b ne~1t by joining with
ger orga
a
cil.
ntral12
bargainin~
·
un ii a
pl
ight aim at
un!form negot1a_
r empt
pre
d by all the
union , at I
1
ng b
a . The ability of th
mailer un
t
ization
ng b nefit might iner a e ma
Id
collect
r of the group. Furthermore,
e
uld benefit from th la rger prof iona l
· ia~r . of th big
unio n , who would h Ip prepar t h council'
po 1t1on on mat
to b n gotiat d for uniform application.
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I
A related advantage of a centralized tructure involvi·ng a
il
.
·
of union
accru t o t h e 1ecte d and professional
union rep counct
· ·
.
resen Ia.
t 1ve
. epara t e b argammg
on f rmge
benefit item for exa
would s_e mingly lead to different negotiated results for each ump e,
depe!1?mg perhap up_on th~ in?iyidual union's power , labor
cond1t1on , and the -~111 of md1v1dual negotiator . Differing results
could _make ?me union lea~e: appear r \atively inept in the eye
of their con t1t_uents. Bargammg by a council may yield uniform reult , at lea t m ome areas, and avoid much of thi political proble".1 of ra~k-~nd -file di. plea ure . Furthermore, the cooperation of
union . w!thm
council (es en the P'_'Obability that the larger
organ1Zat1on will u _e t~eir powe~ to raid th~ memberships of the
!es powerful orgamzat10ns. The increased internal stability that
r ult for each organization may allow its leader to concentrate
th 1r aUentions upon furthering their member ' interests in dealing with management.

m!~~t

The management of many private firm and public agencie have
al. o found that dealing with horizontally -centralized union tructur ha major advantage . One is efficiency. Collective bargaining that i conducted separately with a large number of union
expend a great. deal of management' time and monetary
re ·ource · in the bargaining proce it elf.
Management finds that a great advantage of bargaining with a
centrali.z ed union structure may lie in the uniformity of negotiated
re ult . Union that represent relatively heterogeneous group of
worker will not likely bargain through a central structure for uniform ba ic pay level or ba ic pay increa e , but they may likely
bargain centrally for uniform, negotiated result on fringe benefit
i. ue , grievance procedures, eniority and union security proviion , and some work rules. The e negotiated re ult would not
vary by the relative trength of the unions, nor would they vary
locally by the relative trength of particular union local if the cen· ,
tralized bargaining was being conducted above the local level.
Morale and, thus, productivity may be enhanced becau e_ bitter·
nes i not engendered among employees due to widely different
fringe benefits and work rule . Those re ponsible for p~r onnel a~mini tration can more efficiently communicate negotiated ~r?v 1•
ion to the variou line managers of employees, and the P:ov1Sion
are more likely to be uniformly applied. In particular, first· _a~d
econd-line upervi ors can more easily be trained in the admmis·
tration of negotiated re ults. Tran fer of these individual to th e
upervision of employees in another bargaining u~it doe . not
require extensive retraining in contract admini?trat1on . _el~~e~
are employees transferring among bargaining unit u_ncertam a
significantly different contract provisions may be applied to them.
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The benefits of horizontally-centralized union structure , which
are realized by mploy rs, may al o be r alized by ociety. For
exampl e, centraliz d bargaining hould involve les people hour of
management time and mon tary r ources. This hould tran late
into low r un it co t for any given volume of output if all other
thing remai n th ame (the "c t ris parib u "a umption common ly made by economi ts). If centralization and uniform, negotiated
outcome mean net, positive morale effect , and productivity
increa e , t h n, ce te ri paribu . unit cost will be lower for any
giv n volume of output. Lower unit co t may be pa sed on to con um r in lower pr ic , or extra ervice , d pending upon the mar
ket power of th employer, the profit or non-profit tatu of the
employ r. and p rhap oth r variable . Moreover, ind u trial peace
might be more likely a union horizontally centralize for bargain ing. H negotiat d re ult are more uniform, rank-and-file di con tent ari ing from compari on with negotiated re ults of other
union , which bargain with th am
mployer, may be I
likely
to o cur. Productivity lowdown and trike which damag th
public' intere t would he 1
probable.
Many of tho oppo ing th combination of union into horizontal ly-c ntraliz d truclur believ that union are able lo collud in
pu hing their average wage and fringe ben fit furth r above
competitiv labor market level than would occur in th ab ence of
centralization. nit labor o t ar higher, ceteri paribu , than
th y would be without centralization. If price t nd toward unit
co t lev 1 . th n price paid by con umer of th firm' good or
ervice. will b high r than oth rwise. Thi may mean employment
decrea
in Lh particular firm. Di ·plac d worker might hift to
olh r labor markets and depr
th wage of workers in tho e
market ·-worker who. along with other con um r . ar paying
Lh higher prices for th original firm' good or ervice .
Ev n if averag compen ation 1 1 ar pu h d high r than
oth rwi ·e by union l'entralization, th adver e theoretical re ult
expou d by oppon nt of c ntralization do not n ce arily follow.
High r than -0th r i
wage level · might bring morale-induced
produl'Livity inc rea es -ufficient to prevent any ri in unit labor
co ·t ·. Furth rmor , if th firm ngag d in bargaining ha ignifi canl market power. th price which it charge may have little rela tion. hip to unit co t I vel .
It can be argued t hat un ion n gotiator in centralized bargaining
struclur a r mor aware of. and concerned with, th adver e mploymenl effect of inordinate increa e in unit labor costs . L t u
a ume t hat on union bargai n fo r the kill d worke r and a noth r
u~ ion bargain for t he un kil l d worke r of t he a m em ployer .
R1s in unit la bor co t for all the worker , b yond a e rage pro, will tend to d crea e mployment for th un ductivity in rea
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k~led wk~r11kedrs dispropor~ionately. 'J'.herefore, if t he skilled worker
an_ un I e worker union bargain centrally , t he latter union
n:i1ght ~xert pressur~ on th_e f?rmer to keep the average compensation gam of both union within rea on.
Perhap _the strongest argument for centralized bargainin
~ructure I made by knowledge~ble academicians and practf
~10n_e r . ~ho hav een both centralized and decentral ized bargaining in act10n. They ob er~e that upercompetitive compen ation increa e are often more likely where everal union bargain individua!ly with managem nt. Each union attempts to "leapfrog" its
negotiated ettlement over that of the last union involved in
negotiation . 3 Al o, it may be le e~ y f~r the public and government to learn about, and re pond to, mordmate compen alion gains
reached in decentralized negotiation .
Do the centralization of union bargaining tructures result in
ocial benefit greater than, qual to, or le than ocial co ts?
Theoretical arguments already pre ented can be u d to upport
eith r a po itive or a negative ocial evaluation, and empi rical evidence is ufficiently mixed that w cannot yet reach a conclusion on
empirical ground . However, it is the opinion of thi writer that the
final private and ocial evaluation of centralized bargai ning tructure will primarily rest on other ground than tho e discus ed o
far. Our conclu ion on both centralized union and management
tructure will depend upon how well the
tructures accomodate
adequate degrees of both re pon ibility and democracy
imultaneou ly. In the trade-off of re pon ibility ver us democracy
lie the greate t tr ngth and the greate t weakne s of centralized
bargaining tructure .

Re ponsibility versus Democracy
Re pon ibility in bargaining tructure mean that nego~iat?r
hould have th authority to bring bargaining to a final and bmdmg
conclu ion. They hould not have their po itions unde rcut or repudiated by their constituencie . Re ponsibility al o infer that b_argaining tructure should enable negotiator to co~ ider the 1m·
pact of their action and negotiated re ult upon oc1ety.
Both horizontally - and vertically - centralized tructure tend to
in ulate union negotiators from dir ct ob ervation and pre su~e_by
th rank -and -file union member . Thi means that the bargammg
process may be le s long and less complicated than othe,r ~ise. T_he
union negotiators need spend !es of their time in the political activ·
itie a ociated with co nvincing the rank-and-file t hat t hey a~e
being well r epr ese nted in bargaining. Mor time can be. spent in
moving t he negot iations towa rd a satisfacto ry conclus10n . The
aut hority to mak e fin al d ecisions on contract term !11ay al o hav~
nowed ver tically or hor izon ta ll y to t he union negotiator , so tha
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the final po ilion of these negotiators will not b r pudiated by th
rank-a nd - ii . Mor o r, so ial re ponsibility spring. from c ntral
ized bargaining. enlralizing bargaining make th re. ull of
negotiati n more visibl , and both government and the publir ar
mor ab! to influenc th n gotiators toward r ult. that ar con
id r d ocially r a. onable. Th "I apfrogging" of on union'.
demands ov r tho of anoth r. and the high rat of wage inllation
which ma r ull, i al ·o avoid d in horizontally -c ntraliz d bar
gaini ng.
Many example. of th irr pon ·ibility !lowing from d C'entraliz d
bargaining ha, e been cit d in th literatur . The I apfrogging dC'
mand of craft union in th ragmented bargaining of the construe'
lion indu . try is an important xampl . 1 Empiri al support for th •
exe rci · of r • p nsibilily by centraliz d union lructure i. al"o
availabl . and on of th mo. t ut landing exampl " is the •xp r
i nt<' of the T nnes ee Vall y ,\ulhorily. an independ nl agency of
th f deral governm nt. TV a\ h gan bargaining in 1 37 with a high
ly l'Cnlralized council ·omp sed of 1..J ,\ FL craft unions\\ hich r pr<'
ented ih hlu -('Ollar work r . :\1anag ment found the exerci. e of
respon . ihility by thi. <·ounc·il lo b
::;atisfactory that. \\ h n fj\
union.., of ,, hite -eollar and profe sional employ e were form d in
th' 19 IO's, it pr -.. ur d th sf' organizations into forming their own
<'entralizPd strudure for bargnining. ' inc that time. the ex rcise
of re pon-.ihilily by both c ntraliz d union -,tructur at T\"A ha
conlinul'd _.;
'.\lanagem<•nt bargaining strul·t Ur<'s must also be responsibl .
Tht• l'Xt..,Ll'nc·e of r -,pom,ibility in thp-, strunur • ma~ primarily
rdate lo lht• levt•l of those who ar 1moh din negotiation. within
the• rnanagc•ment hierarchy. I to,, len•l manager p rform the
nPgotiating fun('Uon. p ·rhap" on a de(' •ntraliZ<' I basis. th y may· b
, ulnt>rahl' to upp r manag m nt · rej <·tion of a tentative al{r
rnent. Th ·ref re. th managemrnt bargaining structun• must lw
one• m "hi ·h n gotiator.., ('an communicate with. and nj y th ('On
fiden(' of, top managem •nt and board of dir<'t'tor .... The \Crtical
t· ·nLralization of de •i-,ion -making po\H•r r g-arding managcm nt
postti ns during nl'gotiations ma~ bl' necc sar) in some degrt• .
Esp nail) in publi<· se("lor bargaining-, managt•ment structur
have oftc•n not lwen rt>spon-;ihlc- in this st•ns •. Managt>menl nego
tiator ... ha\'P, •en their po ... ition ... r pudiated from abov : the di ere
Lion giv n th m in lh managmt>nl bargaining ... tructure has not
ht•t•n gr •at or well defin d. Furthermor . managem nt r ponsibil
ity i wpakenc'd in th
. , . political systc m vi ·-a- i a pa rliam n
tary ... ystt•m, wher executi, and legi lativ d c1sion -making ar
larg ly t·omhined. Publi · cto r management may find its bargain
ing agT em nt r pudialed in a legi !alive body wh n. for xampl .
fund" n C'e ·sa ry lo nforc th agrr mcnt ar nol mad availabl .
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In fact, I gi, latur
hav
numb r of occa ion •·

rej cted n golial d

ttlem nt on a

Th oth r dim nsion of th imponant trad -off in bargaining
..,lru tur is d mo racy. Th d g-r of d mocracy embodi d in a
uni n_ or ma_nag m nt hargaining -,t,ructur is the r lat.iv ability of
con tltu nc1~s l control lh p~ ition lak n by n gotiator .
Democracy 1s mor act'ur~tely defrned broadly a con tituent conL'.ol O\' r repr
ntat1ve 1n all a p cL of union -manag menl relal1on..,, herau.., many control. apply lo mor than coll ctive bargainrng. it If.

J•

.

The t rm 1_ ?ft n not applied Lo th managem nt bargaining
..,tructure. Thi. 1s a m1 take, .lor man_ag m nt negotiator certainly
ha\
on t1tu nt . . Th ha. I<' con..,t1tu ncy of n gotiator in the
privat
ctor would b the lot'khold r : th oretically. the public
\\Ould h the ha. tc· on utu nc·y of publir s ctor negotiator . R ali. t1cally. n ith r group t'an he giv n eff ctive, direct input into the
po-,1t1on., tak n by manag ment n gotialor., befor and during
n gotiauon-,. Yet. an th r important con titu n ·y should and can
h giv n r a. onahl d morratic control . Let u..., a. sum Lhal taff
employe r lation. ffic r p rform th n gotiating function . Line
managem nl mu<;t administ r th negotiated r '>Ult. and hould be
gt, n ff, tiv input into he ma nag- m nt . . tanc in n goliation .
Lin managem n hould h r pr ...,ent d on th n gotiating Learn
and ...,hould ha\l' a m aningful rol in formulating manag ment'
po ition...,. Tangibl hen fits l'an r suit from building Lhi type of
demoeraey into th bargaining truetur : lin manag ment i mor
lik ly lo upporl the n g-otial d re ults and th s rt' ull. ar mor
like!\ to be ad mint. tc•rc'd <'Ons1-,tentlv in all op rating divt 10n and
d p~rlmenh. Al-.,o, top ma nag m nt·ma,:. h le . likely tor pudiate
negotiated r ...,ults..., hirh have b n intlu nc d by a broad p c·trum
of management, o both dPmoc-racy and r -,pon. ibility would accrue
to lh<' ma nag ment ..,t ruet ure .
Th~• degr of d moera<'y in union bargaining -,truetur' ha-, long
b nan important analytieal ,..,..,UP. Incle d. bargaining- is not "coll<'di, " if rank and -file ..., orkers hav in-.,ignificant controls and
c-h ek. , r th ir repr
nta i, . \.\' rk rs would not b greatly
n d by a union whi1·h fought arbitrary tr alment by mploy r •
but v..h1C'h sub titut d ih O\\n un ·ontr llabl bur aucrac} over
m mb r..,. \for o, r, when the rank and fil f I impot nl in con·
trolling th ir r pr
ntat,~ s, ocial damag ·an r ult and take
the form of contrac r jection . I gal and ill gal strike , or low
moral and produ ·tivity, Th gr at t pot ntial drawback of true·
lural c ntralizalion on th union id i th po. ibilily that central·
iz d t r uctur
mbody an unacc plably low d gre of d mocracy.
Two major m thod of controlling union I ad r may b open to
rank -and file union m mb r : th I c ion control and th r fe r n·

dum control. By electing their I a
and p rhap their negotia tor , union member ca
r
th
inion on the conduct of net r .T
deral gov rnment believed
gotiation and on oth
the lection control
o important that it fo
d th regular
el ction of union lead
prov id d f
nd
mo
ic elec tion proc dur in the Landrum -Griffin
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..
the lal st n gotiat d settlemen . Why not, ther fore, im 1
guarant er ferC'ndum right:, to all union m rnb r through fed p YI
or stat stat ut -.'!
era
Th prtrn~r~- _rea o_n i · tha~ ~he referendum i ue I important in
th r spons1b1l~ly _ol bargammg_ tructure . a. w U a in their
democracy. ReJect1ons of tentat1H• agreem nt-- by con tituencies
r~•11 cl a lJse_of d mocratie control. hut they al o undermi ne collecl1n• ha_rgatntnl{ and may I ad to work ·toppag which damage the
publtt· mtcre-.t.

J.

In a --ampl • o1 f Pd ral :\1E'diation and ont'iliation rvic jointrnl'e mg <·a (• . <'O\ Prtng the 196-1 19fi9 p riod, rank-and-file contraC't r jPetions oecurred in O\<'r tt>n pcrc nt of all ca e during each
ol th1 la:-.l tiH y ars ol thc> . tud,\ period. Ev n though the FMC
ampl • \\'a hia,pd toward troubl •some ca.·es, th appa rent l vel of,
and up\\ard trPnd in. rontrart r Jection wa alarming. 9 A more
eomprehensiv analy ·i ol rank and-filp reJeetion., ha ed upon
anoth r F;\IC~ :-.ample, al o found a 12A percent rate of
rc•jcC't ion . 10 Jn a . ignil"i<'ant nu mli r of coll ctiv bargaining ituaturns, union nt·gotiator. werl· h1•ing undercu , th er dibility of
thest• ne~ot1ator<- in futurP hargammg \\a b ing damag d, and the
ahilil,\ of lht bar~aining pro· ss lo peae •fully <·ulminate in jointlydNermm d re ulb wa. b in!{ rod d.
Thu . a lrnde-off xists in tht• r pon. 1bilily ver u lhe
dt mtll'rac·) of c n raliz d bargain mg- structure . entraliz d tructure mav bt• vielding -;oC'ial bPnetit that xce d ocial cot,
through cnh,m1•pd pffiC'ien1·y, r lat 1, l' indu;,trial peace, th prevention ol' IPapfroggini(' <"omp n-;ation gains. and po ·itive net moral_e
elfeet . If_ o, proposals relating to th• d moC'racy v r u r pon I·
bihtv trade of! should not he tructural in natur . Th y hould not
simph advo<'at the dt l'entralizalion of t•xisting tructur lo the
point wht•r, adequate rPsponsibility and d mo ·raey ar mot
po,-.;1bl . Rather. the proposals should bl' for procedural chang s in partirnlar. for changps in refer ndum pro· dure .
Fmall), nP\\. propo,al · hould he such tha they cirn_b ~rivately
implem ntC'd b\ <'oil cuve bargainers. The rang ot ·1tuation and
problem. among eoll ctin bargammg s ttin{{s 1. o g~ ~t that
c-hang .., mandat d by lc•l{islation, ·urh a th Landrum -Griffin Act,
are pre, •ntly mappropriat .
E i ·ting

lternati e

Few alt rnatives hav b • n off r d in th ref r ndum i ue. The
lir.-t altPrnative is to simply liminate r f rendum rights . Tho ~
\\. ho advocate thi. alte rnati ve giv great att nLion to th breach .0
union r s ponsib ility cau d by a high incidenc of rank -and-file
refusal. to ratif contract . Th ir propo. al is to allow_the pola~ ex·
treme of zero ralifi<-ation ri ght , and it i u ually applied to union '
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rather than lo both parti s. 11 The propo al offer d al the olh r x
trem i that r ferendum rights hould b ab olule. "Ab olute"
r ferendum right would exist if union and management consti
tuenci s had th unre.train d right to romm nt upon the tentative
agreement reach . d by th ir n•pr _entative _ i~ negol!ations and to
reject thi tenlat1v agr ement without bearing a direct penalty.
Proponent of thi. alternativ
downplay the incid nee of
rank-and -file contract r jection. in comparison with the importance
of ab olut r f rendum rights to Lh d mocra ·y of bargaining
truclur s. 1-'

A third alt rnative i for . mailer group than l h rank -and -file a
a whole lo participate in refer nda on tentative agr emenl . It 1s
argued that uch a control procedur would b analogous to the
U.. political sysl rn of r pre!-.entativ , v r ·us pure. d mocracy. 1
uch an all rnativ can be viable' in som coll ctive bargaining
trucwr s , and rel al ion. hip _. lls fficacy would d pend upon the
ize of the' ratifi ·ation group a. a p re ntage of the rank and -file,
th m Lhod and frequl•m·y of the group ' -.;el ction. Lh propen ·ity
of th group lo ad more re..,ponsibl) than the rank and-fil . and
oth r factor.,,
A final alt rnative alreadJ ugg st d would allow n ~otiation to
h eonducl d on a eenlralized basis, with no ratification right. for
m mb rs of th union( ) in\'OI\' d . But only a total dollar amount of
eompen:...ation gain., \\-Ould b negoliat d at the centralized I vel.
Detentralizc>d nc>gotiators "ould th •n bargain over th manner in
whieh all. or part. of thr gains would b divided into basir pay and
\ariou<; fringe ar as . The rank -and fil ""ould ha\c> rlertion eontroL
and, pcrhnps, r f •rend um control- ov r Lhrsc- dcrPntralized nego
tiator..,, and nt•gotialions. 1~ Expc>r1mentation with procedure for
the dPe ntraliz d suppl menlation of c ntrally det rmined r suit.
would be u eful.
• t!W

Alternative

Ho,,., ever, ne\, pr posal-.; need to focus upon the ref rend um
issue. indc>pendent of lhP le\'el at which collec-tiv barl{aining i· con?Ud d. , l'W propo,-ab should also he ind pendent of them thod of
1mpas..,e rpsolution, for th se anah lical i -su s are not the am .
Th sc> eondit1ons will hem t 111 th ·pr ' dure.., to bP no\\ propo ed .
ThP proc·edures provide alternatives bet w n Lh polar extrem of
zer? ref rc>ndum right and ab,;olut r f rendum right . Th y ar
d •sign d lo provide the con..,lituenri s of negotiator · with referen
dum control hut, at the sam time, to rl crea e the likelihood that
rejections oft ntative agreem nt. - will oc ur.
An in -d plh study of union rontract r jections determin d that
"th cau. e of rontra t rej ction · oft n . tern fr m a common
"ourc : a malfunc ion or di ruption of t h norm al communication
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. nder the ~r~cedur , a n utral woul?. autom~lica lly be brought
mto the bargammg pr c s after a pec1f1ed p nod of negotiation .
Th neutral could prepar for, or carry out, m diation activitie but
would aLo hav additional, d fined r pon ·ibiliti .
Let u~ a . um that t~e negoti~L?r _r ached tentativ agreement
on a n w contract. ubJ ct t rat1f1cat1on by a r f r ndum of rankand-file union memb r . and by th con nt of upp r management
or a board of dir ctor . The d finition of "tentative agr em nt," of
(·our::. . would b crucial and would ha to b clea rly pelled out in
th proc dure. P rhap . th n ulral would d clare a tentative
agr m nt upon the signature of all, or a majority, of th negoof both partie . Thi would d p nd upon the
tiating commill
pri r agr ement of th partie . But th ignatur . and the declaration b~ th n utral of a t ntative agr m nl, would only be relevant in making th remaind r of th proc dur op rativ .
n(· a l ntati\ e agr
pr pare and or certify
term of th
ree
.
con t1tu nc
cone
would al o
enl
t

wa: declar d, t
tral would
cnl d lineating
aining the
tat ment would b
nt d to all
ritt n form. P
e neutral
t orally to ratification m eting .

Thi. part of a r f r ndum proc dur would b de ign d as a
. imp le> aid in th straightforn ard comm uni alion of contract term .
Di,. enting union or manag m nl n gotiator , or de iou ne~ot!a·
tor.., igning th t ntaliv agr m nl in bad faith, could till 1'.1 ·
flu nc con tituE>nc1 to r ject the contract. Hop full , th co t m
th troubl and 'X P ns of uch a proc du re would not xc d the
benefit flowing from 1mprov d ·ommunicalion : 1 contract_ re•
jection by union rank -and fil , by top manag m nt, and by leg1 la·
ti\. bodi in th public sector . Thi would b . however, only the
fir. t pha::. of sev ral proc dural po . ibiliti

L t

la
af
cif
prio r
uni
n tr
t n
p nalty.
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at the umon rank -and -fil
par d to vol on the
l, a c rtifi d by th
al. Th ir vot would
h r dim n. ion of
atification proc dure
ontra t. For a certain numb r of pay period
i
r contr act ex piration, a rlain p re ntag odf
b
pay (a nd p rhap th union ' tr a ury) ~a
d
tru l rund . Th union m mb r could reJect
m nl , but th y would incur a proc dur

Upon th ir rej ction of a t ntativ agr m nt, the ntire fund
would r v rt to a charity, pr -d ignated by both partie . If th
contract wa ratified, th fund would revert ba k to th m mb r hip (and Lo th trea ury) . Thu , th rank -and -fil have a traightfo rward di in nliv to r j ct the contract, ev nthough th y can
choo e to uff r th mon tary p natty if th tentativ agr ement i
ufficiently on rou . Th
face a p. ychologi al "carrot" for ratify ing the contra t - a on -tim r mittanc of th ir paym nt plu
int r t.
no h r advantage of th proc dur L that it give all union
m mber, an in · ntive to ot ; it h Ip tor liev a major problem of
the r f rendum control - low vol r parti ipation.
nd r th
pro dur d cribed, ach union m mber would b mor immediately aff c d than oth rwi e by a ·•y •· or "no .. vot of th memb r. hip a a hol .
Th pro,·edure would apply to both parti . Privat
ctor firm ,
·p cially, would also hav b n making paym nt into a tru t fund
for an equal tim period. 1,; Paym nt by the firm would xactly
match tho . e by the uni n m mb r hip (and th union ). One th
t ntativc agre m nt wa d lar d, the firm could r tri ve it fund
plu inl r t upon ratification f h agr menL by top management
and the board of dir clor . Failur t ratify would r ult in tran f r
of lh firm' t.ru. t fund to th prede ignat d charity. Th n utral
would b r • pon ibl for them chanic of Lhi. automati operation.
For th manag men
nee
· the public c
upp
nag
t and
atte
Yel,
budg
bot
utiv
part
ma
pro
d pr
fund prior to negotiati
lowed.

i
.
i
r
t

h

ratification proc dure i mo t
ad y noted. contract rej ct ion by
· · mo t common in public
public
or, involving
I
gi lati
odi , might
m
Paym
into a tru t
ntr
ration might not b al -

Th old t·ontra -t could p ify a
dure p cially ailor d for
th managem nt ide in the publi
r . Let u a um that th
union ide had ac umulat
300,
ru t fund, and th fund had
r v rted hack to
hip
h union ) upon th ir ratifi calin of th tent
agr
nt.
a
that
umulation of a manag
fund had b
i a
by th
lati
body in
rmor . a
hat
gi lati
y r
d to
t
tract by pr
g
ary fu
d r
d t
t
ment of a monetar
It bee
of i
ra
n. Th I gi lativ action mi
nd n gotiation or
e th
at an impa
.
verth I . th old contra t could p cify a p nail for r j clion on th managem nt id . whi h would not d p nd upon I i la -
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tive a ppropri_ation . T h old contr act could pecify . or t he neutral
could ? ~term t~e. a~ average hou r ly wage r ate for all workers in the
b~r_gam1:1g um t{ ) involved, let u · ay $3 per hou r . T hi would be
d1v1ded into t h $300,000 pre\ iou ·ly exi t ing in the union fund to
dete r mine t hat 100,000 people hour of work wa the leisure time
equivalent of th $300.000. The 100,000 hour would be di vided
among th worke r concC'rned. If 5,000 work er wer in t he relevant ba rgaining unil(s), Pach would be awa rd ed 20 hour of lei ure
ltm . The cont r act . or the neutral, could specify how t he leisure
time might b pread over a certain time pe riod . 17 Management
m1g_hl be, ?r ~ight n?t be, allow d to keep worker on t he job
during their 1 1sur e time award - at do u bletime pay rate . Of
coun,e, th legi ·lative body might be able lo nul li fy t he lei ure time
payment by pecial action. But such action would be highly vi ible
and would invite an adverse public reaction.
The proc dure. described relate str ictly to t he referendum
proce . .. After contract r 3ection , the pa rties may find the m elve
at a bargaining impa .. e . and, especially in t he private ector, a
trike may occur. 1' However, the procedu r · proposed wo uld not
interfere with any impas e- r e ·olution pr oced ure pecified in the old
eontract, or ub quenlly adopted.
Let u · a sume that management' penalty wa worker time-off
as jut de.,cribed. Furthe r as ume that t he t ntative agreement
wa. r ejected on t he management side, and t he unio n member ubsequentl:,. went on st r ike. The tim -off penalty wo uld till be given
to the worke rs. when the new contract became effective. The
penalty would be carried out without rega r d fo r t he method of impasse r olution.
Even if a nonstoppage strike plan had been pro cribed fo r impasse re. olution (se footnote 16). t he refe r e ndum procedure
would not affect its im plcmentation . T r u. t fund . for the
refPrendum procedure would already have been d ispos d of prior to
the beginning of the non toppage str ike. T ru t fund pay ment for
the non . toppage t ri ke would begin after t he impas e which follow •
ed a contratt rejection. Award · of lei ur e ti me in t itut d under the
ref rendum proc du r e co uld be ca r ri d out d ur ing th e non toppage
-,trike.

If rnmpul ory a nd bi nd ing a r bitration had b en specified i_ n the
old (•o nt r act, t he contr act could have m ade the implementat10n_of
refe rend um proce dure p na lti s non -arbitrabl . o m t hod of impa. sc reso lu t io n would nece sarily conflict with t he referendum
proc dures. On th e ot he r hand , additional a lternative in referen·
dum procedures can be formulated to ti e- in wit h ce r tain method_s of
impa
resolution . Collective bar gainer can be given more choices

24

in decid ing upon a r f rendum procedure which be t meets their
need.

A um that a labor contract provided for the final-offer arbitra tion of bargaining impa e , where an arbitrator accepts the final
offer of either managem nt or the union in toto a the terms of the
new contract.
um further that the rank -and -file and top
manag ment had ref r ndum right , but with another type of di incentive for rejection of a tentative argument. If either con tituency r ject d a tenta ive agr em nt, however defined, bargaining would tart again; pre umably the parti 'po ition would di v rge. After both parti had made one new offer on th di puted
it m the party not rej cting th tentative agr ement would have
an automatic option. That party could declare a "final offer," which
would be nt to the final offer arbitrator, along with the la t offer
of th oth r party . Th other party, rejecting the t ntative agre ment, would be pla d in a tacti al di advantag during the r new d bargaining.
Th am proc dure could work along with a procedure pecify ing the traditional form of final and binding arbitration, in which
th arbitrator i aUow d to compromi the final offer of both partie . The party not r j cting th t ntativ agre m nt could invoke
arbitration at it di cretion.
A mor lik
envi ion d
m thod of
the public
i u ually
m thod of
rejection of
ti would h
party would
bargaining.
could, at anyti

Ir f
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tor. wh r th right
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e ify a
tion to b om operative only upon th
r ement. The con titu nci of both pardum right , but contract rejection by on
other party an automatic option in further
th ide: had mad a new offer, the other party
ke the di pute to final and binding arbitration.
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ac~rue to t he part(e and t_o ociety. while ffective control by cont1tu nt o er th 1r n got1ator ar not totally r moved.
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